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On May 5 , 2021 the International Energy Agency （IEA） launched its authoritative 
report on The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions （hereafter, Critical 
Minerals）．The 285-page document is one of 3  flagship special reports underpinning the 
IEA’s aim to outline the material, financial and other requirements for a global roadmap to 
net-zero decarbonization by 2050. Thus Critical Minerals aggregates the best-available cur-
rent evidence on the supply and demand for copper, nickel, lithium, rare earths, silicon, and 
other metals and minerals crucial to clean-energy technologies. Its compelling visual presen-
tation and well-written analysis shows that the faster and deeper we pursue decarboniza-
tion, the more we need prodigious quantities of critical minerals. Yet current supply chains 
are simply inadequate to meet oncoming demand. The report outlines myriad risks that can 
only be addressed through smart and global collaboration. It is a wake-up call to Japan, and 
all other countries committed to decarbonization, to undertake immediate and robust policy 
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changes. In this paper, we discuss the report’s findings and then turn to assess its implica-
tions for Japan.
Energy Transition Materials
Critical Minerals 1 ） emerged at a very important time. It follows a series of increas-
ingly concerning studies on mineral demand for the energy transition. The report follows a 
decade of EU-funded scoping and other studies that increasingly assess global demand 
across power, mobility, communications, health tech, military, space, and other categories. To 
quote an editorial in the April, 2021 edition of the academic journal Materials, “The indisput-
able conclusion after about 10 years of finalized CRM projects research is that the most ad-
vanced technologies required for the green and digital transition will lead to a drastic in-
crease in demand.” 2 ）
In addition, it was published shortly after the March 2021 release of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency （IRENA） annual update to its Renewable Energy Statistics. 3 ） 
The IRENA report highlights that in 2020 , total global power capacity additions were 260 
gigawatts （GW）， of which over 80% was renewable, versus roughly only 20% in 2001. And 
the IRENA data show that among the renewable capacity additions, fully 91% were solar 
and wind. 
The IEA’s study helps greatly to understand the material implications of this striking 
trend towards increased renewables. Critical Minerals is not in the least opposed to renew-
able energy, but warns that failure to act now to secure adequate and environmentally-sus-
tainable supplies of critical minerals threatens, in short order, to bring on price increases and 
other shocks that will likely delay decarbonization and increase its cost. The report is the 
most comprehensive study yet available, assessing 16 key clean-energy technologies and 
several critical minerals, including cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and select rare earths. The 
sobering conclusions of Critical Minerals are, if anything conservative as it does not include 
1 ） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 is accessible at the following URL: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of- 
critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions
2 ） See Girtan, Mihaela, et al. “The Critical Raw Materials Issue between Scarcity, Supply Risk, 
and Unique Properties,” Materials, April, 2021 : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC8067847/
3 ） See Renewable Energy Statistics 2021 , International Renewable Energy Agency, March 2021 : 
https://irena.org/publications/2021/March/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2021
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the prodigious critical mineral demand in health care, space technologies, defence systems, 
and other very mineral-intensive areas.4 ） Nor does it analyze the full slate of 30-odd critical 
minerals in Japanese, EU, US, Canadian, Australian, and other countries’ current lists.
The IEA work will guide discussion of decarbonization at the COP26 and other high-
level talks scheduled for 2021 and afterwards. But there is a risk of its analysis being inter-
preted through partisan lenses. On the one hand fossil-fuel advocates were quick to declare 
that Critical Minerals shows the energy transition away from fossil fuels is emissions-inten-
sive and otherwise compromised. 5 ） And on the other hand, the pro-renewable Carbon 
Tracker think-tank’s analysts were cited dismissing the findings with the assertion that “no 
amount of fancy footwork by apologists for the fossil fuel system should deflect us from the 
central point that we have the resources to make the energy transition a reality and to usher 
in a new age of growth and prosperity.” 6 ） Critical Minerals in fact supports neither extreme 
and hence deserves a detailed, dispassionate analysis.
So let us explore the highlights of the report. Figure 1  outlines the range of energy 
technologies the IEA team assessed and their respective reliance on several focus critical 
minerals. The reliance is expressed in black, grey and white dots, indicating respectively 
high, medium and low reliance. As is evident, EVs and battery storage are particularly vora-
cious in their need for critical minerals. Among power generation technologies, the critical 
mineral requirements for wind and solar variable renewable energy （VRE） are higher than 
hydro, geothermal and nuclear.
Detailed quantification of this material-intensity in transport is seen in figure 2 , which 
outlines the general average of critical mineral density for electric vehicles and clean power 
generation. We see in the top section （“transport”） of the figure that an electric vehicle is 
dramatically more material-intensive than a conventional, internal-combustion engine car. 
Electrification not only requires much more copper per vehicle, but also significant quantities 
of lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths. Overall, an electric vehicle is 5  to 6  
times as mineral-intensive than a conventional vehicle.
4 ） On these broader uses for critical minerals, see “Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sec-
tors: Policy options for the Netherlands and the European Union,” Hague Centre for Strategic Stud-
ies, December 10, 2020: https://hcss.nl/report/securing-critical-raw-materials 
5 ） For example, see Mark P. Mills, “Biden’s NOT-So-Clean Energy Transition,” The Wall Street 
Journal, May 11, 2021: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/bidens-not-so-clean-energy-transition
6 ） Cited in “Record metals boom may threaten transition to green energy,” The Guardian, May 




Similarly, figure 2  demonstrates that clean power generation technologies have signif-
icantly higher material-density, expressed as kilogrammes/megawatt （kg/MW） of genera-
tion capacity. Carbon-intensive natural gas and coal-fired generation require only moderate 
amounts of copper, nickel and other materials for the pipes and other infrastructure that 
compose their plant. By comparison, a nuclear plant has, per MW, more than double the ma-
terial footprint of coal and triple that of natural gas, with an especially heavy reliance on 
chromium. But solar and wind generation have even heavier reliance on such base metals as 
copper in addition to rare earths for offshore wind and silicon for solar. Moreover, the aggre-
gate per-MW amount of critical minerals balloons from a couple of metric tons for a natural 
gas plant to nearly 16 tons for offshore wind. Since wind and solar have considerably lower 
capacity factors – meaning percent of actual power generation versus rated generation ca-
pacity – than fossil-fuel and nuclear plant, their total volume of critical minerals required to 
produce a given amount of power is even higher than expressed in the figure.
Additionally, the IEA data suggest that distributed energy solutions may need 
7 ） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: Shading indicates the relative importance of minerals for a particular clean energy technology （● = high; ●
= moderate; ○ = low）， which are discussed in their respective sections in this chapter. CSP = concentrating so-
lar power; PGM = platinum group metals. 
* In this report, aluminium demand is assessed for electricity networks only and is not included in the aggregate de-
mand projections.
Source: IEA, 20217 ）
Figure 1 　 Critical mineral needs for clean energy technologies
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　 8 ）
rethinking. This is because the more distributed the power generation the higher the material-
intensity: “Distributed solar PV systems tend to have string inverters or microinverters, 
requiring about 40% more copper than utility-scale projects, which typically use central in-
verters. Other mineral intensities are similar between utility-scale and distributed appli-
cations.”　 9 ）
Figure 3  offers more data on key mineral demand for solar power. It enumerates the 
2020 demand, in kilotons （kt）， for copper, silicon and silver in global solar deployments. The 
figure then assesses the likely increased demand according to two scenarios: the Stated 
Policies Scenario （STEPS）， which currently implies global warming of over 3  degrees 
Celsuis, and Sustainable Development Scenario （SDS）， which aims to limits global warming 
to well below 2  degrees Celsius, and ideally to 1.5 degrees. STEPS and SDS are used 
throughout the report. As we see in figure 3 , the SDS and STEPS scenarios for solar vary 
greatly for the years 2030 and 2040. Copper demand more than doubles in SDS 2040, com-
pared to 2020. Silicon, in turn, doubles, by SDS 2040, but then levels off through technological 
change and recycling. Silver in fact declines in the SDS scenario for 2040 compared to a large 
8 ） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
9 ） See p. 56 , The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable 
Energy Agency, May 2021 is accessible at the following URL: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-
role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions
Notes: kg = kilogramme; MW = megawatt. Steel and aluminium not included. See Chapter 1  and Annex for details 
on the assumptions and methodologies. 
Source: IEA, 20218 ）
Figure 2 　 Minerals used in selected clean energy technologies
IEA. All rights reserved.

























increase in SDS 2030. 　10）　11）
Figure 4  then takes up the critical mineral requirement for wind power. It suggests 
that achieving SDS by 2040 requires a tripling of critical mineral demand. The rare earth de-
10）， 11） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
11）
Note: kt = thousand tonnes. 
Source: IEA, 2021 10）
Figure 3 　 Demand for copper, silicon and silver for solar PV by scenario
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Source: IEA, 2021 11）
Figure 4 　 Mineral demand for wind by scenario
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mand is shown to be much more than double 2020 levels in the SDS base case for both 2030 
and 2040, and roughly double even in a constrained scenario. This result highlights the chal-
lenges confronting substitution （or higher efficiency of use） for are earths in the permanent 
magnets using in wind turbines. 
Figure 5  outlines the capacity additions and consequent material demand for concen-
trated solar power （CSP）， geothermal, hydro, and bioenergy. We see that the greatest in-
crease in capacity addition is expected from CSP, which in turn implies a dramatic increase 
in critical minerals. Geothermal power is not expected to contribute much new capacity, and 
in 2020 - the year of most recent comprehensive data12） - provided only 1 % of total global 
renewable power generation, but has a striking dependence on chromium and nickel. The 
least material-intensive renewables are hydro and bioenergy （such as solid biofuels, biogas, 
combustion of municipal waste, and liquid biofuel）． In 2020, hydro represented 43% of total 
global renewable capacity and contributed about 58% （4,418 TWh） of total global renewable 
power generation of 7,660 TWh. For its part, bioenergy represented 9.3% of total global re-
newable power generation in 2020, and is expected to double in capacity in the IEA’S 2040 
SDS scenario. The critical mineral cost of bioenergy is minimal, but the environmental cost is 
often questioned.13）
Figure 6  from Critical Minerals also addresses the role of nuclear energy in decar-
bonizing scenarios. It shows that 2020 capacity additions for nuclear are quite significant in 
China, Russia and the Middle East. Its data for Japan reflect, of course, restarts of idled ca-
pacity rather than new build. The data also suggest that the 2040 SDS scenario requires 
about a doubling of average annual capacity additions, especially in China. The material costs 
of these capacity additions are considerably lower than for most renewables, requiring slightly 
more than 80 kt, mostly chromium, copper and nickel. As we saw in figure 2 , this material 
density per MW of capacity of much less than what is required for solar and wind, even 
without adding the larger power networks （transmission, storage and other infrastructure） 
required for solar and wind. The network data are discussed in the next figure.
Figure 7  presents the IEA’s best guess on the power grid expansion required to 
12） The data are available at “Net Zero by 2050: a Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector,” Interna-
tional Energy Agency, May 18 , 2021 : https://www.iea.org/news/pathway-to-critical-and-
formidable-goal-of-net-zero-emissions-by-2050-is-narrow-but-brings-huge-benefits-according-
to-iea-special-report
13） Thorough analyses of bioenergy can be found in the various publications of the IEA Bioenergy 
Technology Collaboration Programme: https://www.ieabioenergy.com
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　14）　15）
achieve the STEPS and SDS scenarios, based on 2018-2020 drivers and type. The drivers are 
divided into replacement and expansion, whereas type is divided into transmission and distri- 
14）， 15） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
15）
Note: CSP = concentrating solar power. 
Source: IEA, 202114）
Figure 5 　 Annual capacity addition and mineral demand from other renewable technologies 
by scenario　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
IEA. All rights reserved.







































Note: Russia = Russian Federation.
Source: IEA, 202115）
Figure 6 　 Average annual capacity additions and mineral demand from nuclear power
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　16）　17）
bution. We see that both the STEPS and SDS scenarios imply a significant shift in the char-
acter of annual grid demand. Both see annual expansion of the global grids increase signifi-
cantly from under 1,000 kilometers to （in SDS 2031-2040） over 5,000 kilometers. That is a 
16）， 17） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
17）
Note: Includes demand for grid expansion and replacement.
Source: IEA, 202117）
Figure 8 　 Demand for copper and aluminium for electricity grids by scenario




























Figure 7 　 Annual average grid expansion and replacement needs by scenario
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very material-intensive endeavour, as we see in figure 8 .
Figure 8  provides a summary of the megatons （Mt） of copper and aluminum needed 
for the STEPS and SDS scenarios, for 2020, 2030 and 2040. The overall difference between 
the two scenarios in 2040 is over 5  Mt of copper and aluminum.
Figure 9  turns to examine the demand for battery storage in the STEPS and SDS 
scenarios. It shows that the 2020 levels of battery storage additions were minimal, but multi-
ply significantly under any scenario. Yet the SDS 2040 projection is especially huge, with well 
over 6,000 gigawatt-hours （GWh） of battery storage. The lion’s share is for battery-electric 
vehicles （BEV in the figure）．　18）
Figure 10 follows up on the above with an analysis of the material implications of the 
storage scenarios. The 2020 levels of demand are negligible, but rapidly mushroom. In the 
SDS 2040 scenario, over 800 kt of materials is required, centred on copper, graphite and va-
nadium. The rates of demand growth are also stupendous in the case of lithium, with two-
digit increases being the norm, and a startling 140 times increase for lithium in the SDS 2040 
scenario.
18） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: Light-duty includes passenger light-duty vehicles, light commercial vehicles, and two- and three-wheelers. 
Heavy-duty vehicles include medium-sized freight trucks, heavy freight trucks and buses. BEV = battery elec-
tric vehicle; PHEV = plug-in hybrid electric vehicle; GWh = gigawatt hour. 
Source: IEA （2020c）．
Source: IEA, 202118）
Figure 9 　 Global battery capacity additions
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　19）　20）
19）， 20） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
20）
Note: Silicon and vanadium are excluded from the demand growth graph. 
Source: IEA, 202119）
Figure 10　 Mineral demand from battery storage additions in the SDS
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Note: Silicon is excluded from the demand growth graph due to its very high growth （over 500-fold increase）， start-
ing from a low base.
Source: IEA, 202120）
Figure 11　 Mineral demand from new EV sales
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Figure 11 continues with an analysis of the material implications of the battery-elec-
tric vehicle scenarios. The volumes dramatically exceed those required for storage batteries, 
such that the SDS 2040 scenario for new EVs is just under 12,000 kt. And here too the 
growth rates of demand are double-digit.　21）
Yet quite unlike recent literature from fossil-fuel advocates, Critical Minerals does not 
in the least argue that this higher material footprint negates the decarbonizing effect of elec-
tric vehicles and renewable energy. Its detailed assessments include, as seen in figure 12, the 
comparative lifecycles emissions for an electric and conventional vehicle. The IEA data show 
that even assuming GHG-intensive materials and electricity, the electric vehicle’s lifecycle 
emission are less than half its conventional counterpart.
The Need for Unprecedented Volumes
But as we see in figure 13, the urgent challenge is in meeting the oncoming tsunami of 
demand for critical minerals used in clean generation, electrical networks, and electric vehi-
21） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: BEV = battery electric vehicle; ICE = internal combustion engine. The “High-GHG minerals” case assumes 
double the GHG emissions intensity for battery minerals. Includes both Scope 1  and 2  emissions of all GHG 
from primary production. See Chapter 4  for more detailed assumptions. 
Source: IEA analysis based on IEA （2020a）; IEA （2020b）; Kelly et al. （2020）; Argonne National Laboratory （2020）; 
Argonne National Laboratory （2019）; Rio Tinto （2020）; S&P Global （2021）; Skarn Associates （2021）; Marx et al. 
（2018）．
Source: IEA, 202121）
Figure 12　 Life‐cycle GHG emissions, electric and conventional vehicles
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cles. The figure shows us that even under STEPS, solar deployment more than doubles be-
tween 2019 and 2040, with corresponding increases in wind, electricity networks and electric 
vehicles. But under the ideal of SDS （if not even more aggressive decarbonization）， solar, 
wind, and power networks triple, while electric vehicles increase an astounding 25 times.　22）
The IEA concludes that the aggregate demand for the 30-odd critical minerals used 
in clean-energy technologies may increase by six-fold or more. Within that increase, depend-
ing on the 11 technological pathways used by Critical Minerals, individual materials confront 
varying demand profiles. For example, in utility scale storage under the SDS, between 2020 
and 2040 nickel demand is projected to grow 140 times, cobalt by 70 times, and manganese 
by 58 times.
Figure 14 suggests the significance of pathways with respect to critical mineral de-
mand. The figure portrays the 2010 percent share of total demand by energy for lithium, co-
balt, nickel, copper and rare earths. We see that energy demand for lithium, cobalt and nickel 
were minimal in 2010 as a share of demand elsewhere （for example, about 70% of nickel is 
used in stainless steel）．23） In 2010, energy demand for copper was already over 20% of all 
22） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
23） Nickel’s uses are described at “End use of nickel,” Nickel Institute, 2021: https://nickelinstitute.
org/about-nickel/#05-end-use-nickel
Notes: PV = Photovoltaic; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario. 
Sources: IEA （2021a）; IEA （2020a）．
Source: IEA, 202122）
Figure 13　 Annual deployment of clean energy technologies by scenario
























































uses, with rare earths just over 15%. But under the SDS 2040 scenario, the energy share of 
demand for all these materials is expected to increase, with the most striking numbers seen 
in lithium, cobalt and nickel.　24）
Markets and Mining
The right-hand side of figure 15 focuses in on the demand growth numbers for lithi-
um, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earths in the SDS 2040 scenario. The demand for each in 
2020 is indexed as 1 , and the growth in demand for SDS 2040 expressed as a multiple of 
that. Hence we see that SDS 2040 implies 42 times more lithium must be produced over the 
next two decades, followed by 25 times more graphite, 21 times more cobalt, 19 times more 
nickel, and 7  times more rare earths. 
The left-hand side of figure 15 shows that the growth in demand does not stop at 
2040, but continues to 2050, with especially large increases in electricity networks and EVs/
24） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: Demand from other sectors was assessed using historical consumption, relevant activity drivers and the de-
rived material intensity. Neodymium demand is used as indicative for rare earth elements. STEPS = Stated 
Policies Scenario, an indication of where the energy system is heading based on a sector-by-sector analysis of 
today’s policies and policy announcements; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario, indicating what would be 
required in a trajectory consistent with meeting the Paris Agreement goals.
Source: IEA, 202124）
Figure 14　 Share of clean energy technologies in total demand for selected minerals 
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battery storage.　25）
One might be inclined to argue – like an economist – that the prospect of such mas-
sive demand will see market mechanisms deftly respond by investing in more mining, great-
er efficiency, and substitution. Critical Materials concedes that history shows these market-
driven responses do indeed happen, but adds that they are “typically accompanied by price 
volatility, considerable times lags or some loss of performance or efficiency.” 
As to price volatility, the left-hand side of figure 16 provides some exemplary evi-
dence. It shows that between January 2015 and January 2021, the volatility in lithium prices 
reached 400% followed by cobalt at over 300%. On the figure’s right-hand side, we see that 
the volatility of mineral prices is generally much higher than for fossil fuels （oil, natural gas 
and coal）， between January 2010 and February 2021. One of the implications of volatility is 
serious investment risk, as miners and other upstream actors have little certainty that they 
can recover their costs for developing critical mineral resources. 
In consequence, waiting for market mechanisms to kick in risks raising the cost of de-
carbonization while also slowing its pace and reducing its depth in difficult areas. If one ac-
cepts that decarbonization is urgent, perhaps on par with producing vaccines against COVID, 
then it is imperative for robust policy to drive markets and other institutions towards the 
25） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: Mt = million tonnes. Includes all minerals in the scope of this report, but does not include steel and aluminium. 
See Annex for a full list of minerals.
Source: IEA, 202125）
Figure 15　 Mineral demand for clean energy technologies by scenario 
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collective goal.　26）
One additional proof of the IEA’s argument is seen in the data in figure 17. The figure 
shows the 2020-2030 clean-energy demand profiles for copper, lithium and cobalt under 
STEPS and SDS. Current and planned mining projects are clearly inadequate for these three 
materials alone, notwithstanding the enormous amount of attention they have received in re-
cent years. Similar charts could be generated for graphite, nickel, rare earths, and the other 
critical minerals essential to energy transition.
Worse yet, massively increased mining of critical minerals is not simply a matter of 
throwing more money at producers. One major problem in this respect is the lead times for 
mining projects. In figure 18, Critical Minerals highlights the bracing fact that, between 2010-
2019, the global average lead time – from discovery to production - for the world’s top 35 
critical minerals mining projects was well over 15 years. The fastest average projects the 
IEA team identify in their report is 4  years for mining lithium in Australia. But finding and 
developing nickel and copper mines take well over a decade, and often closer to 2  decades. 
Even halving these lead times does little to address the demand gaps seen in figure 17.
26） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: Assessment based on Lithium Carbonate CIF Asia, LME Copper Grade A Cash, LME Cobalt Cash and LME 
Nickel Cash prices.
Source: IEA （2020a）， S&P Global （2021）．
Source: IEA, 202126）
Figure 16　 Price movement and volatility of selected minerals
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　27）　28）
27）， 28） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
28）
Notes: Primary demand is total demand net of recycled volume （also called primary supply requirements）．
Projected production profiles are sourced from the S&P Global Market Intelligence database with adjustments to 
unspecified volumes. Operating projects include the expansion of existing mines. Under-construction projects in-
clude those for which the development stage is indicated as commissioning, construction planned, construction 
started or preproduction. Mt = million tonnes. 
Source: IEA analysis based on S&P Global （2021）．
Source: IEA, 202127）
Figure 17　 Committed mine production and primary demand for selected minerals 
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Note: Global average values are based on the top 35 mining projects that came online between 2010 and 2019.  
Source: IEA analysis based on S&P Global （2020）， S&P Global （2019a） and Schodde （2017）．
Source: IEA, 202128）
Figure 18　 Global average lead times from discovery to production, 2010-2019
IEA. All rights reserved.
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The Geopolitical and ESG Issues
Critical Minerals also aggregated the data on comparative geographical concentration 
of fossil fuel and crtical mineral production. We see a summary of their data in figure 19. The 
key point is that the three major fossil fuel producing countries have relatively small market 
shares of oil and natural gas （coal is even more distributed） compared to the top three pro-
ducers of critical minerals. Indeed, just the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone is the 
site of roughly 70% of cobalt production, while China is home to 60% or more of rare earths 
and graphite. The higher the market dominance of the top three, the greater the geopolitical 
risks for consumer countries. These risks include not only incentives to form cartels, but also 
supply-chain risks stemming from increasingly frequent natural disasters, strikes in mining, 
and related phenomena.　29）
In addition, figure 20 shows that there is a much higher dependence on exports among 
critical mineral producers. The left-hand side of the figure highlights the significant number 
of African and Central and South American （C & S America） countries that relied on criti-
cal minerals for over 50% of their exports in 2019. The right-hand side of the figure further 
29） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Sources: IEA （2020b）; USGS （2021）．
Source: IEA, 202129）
Figure 19　 Share of top three producing countries in total production for selected minerals 
and fossil fuels, 2019　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
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breaks down the data to shares of 30% to 50%, and makes the important point that 23 
African countries rely on critical minerals for over 30% of their exports.　30）
The IEA’s analyses of projects in the pipeline also suggests that this concentration is 
very unlikely to change much, at least over the next 5  to 10 years, even though many of the 
production sites have poor performance on governance, human rights, and other indicators. 
That means the complication of long lead times is compounded by ESG challenges. The se-
vere human rights concerns surrounding cobalt – 70% of which is mined in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo – have led to efforts to substitute for it. But as we saw in figure 15, 
the IEA anticipates demand for the mineral to increase 21 times between 2020 and 2040, un-
der an SDS scenario.
We must also not forget that processing of critical minerals is also geographically con-
centrated, as portrayed in figure 21. The very high volatility of demand, the environmental 
costs of refining, and other drivers underlie this concentration. The figure shows that China 
is the dominant player in processing in 2019. While there is significant talk of relocating pro-
30） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: The chart shows countries whose share （based on monetary value） is above 30%. Standard international 
trade classification codes 27 , 28 , 68 , 667 and 971 were included in the minerals and metals category. C & S 
America = Central and South America. 
Source: IEA analysis based on UNCTAD （2021）．
Source: IEA, 202130）
Figure 20　 Share of minerals and metals in total product exports for mineral producing  
countries, 2019　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
IEA. All rights reserved.
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cessing and related supply chains, that is a lot easier said than actually done. 　31）　32）
An additional matter of concern is declining ore grades and their impact on mining’s 
31）， 32） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
32）
Note: The values for copper are for refining operations. 
Sources: World Bureau of Metal Statistics （2020）; Adamas Intelligence （2020） for rare earth elements.
Source: IEA, 202131）
Figure 21　 Share of processing volume by country for selected minerals, 2019























Notes: Energy use for concentrate covers mine, concentrating plant, smelter, refinery and services. For heap leach-
ing, energy use covers mine, leaching, solvent extraction, electro-winning processes and services. GJ = gigajoule. 
Source: IEA analysis based on COCHILCO （2019） and Rötzer and Schmidt （2020）．
Source: IEA, 202132）
Figure 22　 Average ore grade in Chile and estimated energy intensity by quality
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pecuniary and environmental costs. Figure 22 portrays the state of copper ore-grades in 
Chile between 2005 and 2019. The data show that average ore grades declined significantly 
over the period, raising the energy intensity measured in gigajoules （GJ） of energy use per 
Mt of copper. A similar trend is event in other materials.
The upshot of these trends is further explored in figure 23. It shows that declining ore 
grades in copper and nickel – between 2010 and 2017 - leads to higher tailing and waste 
rocks for a unit volume of ore extraction. Tailings and waste rock volumes are measured in 
the billions of tons （1,000 Mt）， and include significant quantities of radioactive materials and 
other impurities.　33）
Figure 24 also shows that energy costs are already relatively high for critical minerals, 
at both the mining and refining areas of the upstream. Indeed, the energy costs for copper 
are just under 20% of total mining cash cost, but as we saw in earlier data are expected to 
increase due to declining ore grades.
These cost and related issues bear on the ESG performance of critical minerals. But 
the IEA data in figure 25 show that a significant share of copper, lithium, nickel and cobalt 
production takes place in areas with poor governance and high emissions-intensity of elec-
tricity. Even where governance is good, as in Austrlian lithium, the emissions intensity is 
33） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Source: IEA analysis based on data updated and expanded from Mudd and Jowitt（2016）．
Source: IEA, 202133）
Figure 23　 Waste generation from copper and nickel mining



















































And human rights are hardly the only ESG conundrum. An additional matter of grave 
concern is that many critical minerals – particularly copper and lithium – are mined in areas 
with high water stress. Figure 26 shows this with data on copper, lithium, zinc, nickel, baux-
ite （the raw material for aluminum） and cobalt. Climate impacts are generally worsening 
water stress in these areas, but mining the minerals requires large volumes of water that it 
often ruins. In consequence, increased mining risks exacerbating water stress in the absence 
of robust and perhaps costly countermeasures such as water recycling and desalinization.
The importance of water is further illustrated in figure 27. The data show that most 
critical minerals require a lot of water per unit of output, and have significant water pollution 
impacts. The fact of generally declining ore-grades suggests coping with these problems is 
an uphill battle.
34） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: ESG = environmental, social and governance; EAF = electric arc furnace; BOF = basic oxygen furnace. 
Energy and electricity costs show global average values, and can vary by region and operational practice. 
Source: IEA analysis based on S&P Global （2021） for mining, BHP （2011） for iron ore and Eurometaux （2020） for 
refining/smelting.
Source: IEA, 202134）
Figure 24　 Share of energy cost in total mining cash cost and electricity intensity for  
selected materials　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
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　35）　36）
35）， 36） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
36） 
Notes: Analysis using the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator （as a proxy for governance） and electricity 
CO 2 intensity （as a proxy for emissions performance）．Composite governance rank scores below 50 were classi-
fied as low governance; electricity CO 2 emissions intensity above 463 g CO 2 /kWh （global average value in 2019） 
was classified as high emissions intensity.
Source: World Bank （2020）， IEA （2020）．
Source: IEA, 202135）
Figure 25　 Distribution of production of selected minerals by governance and emissions  
performance, 2019　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
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Note: Water stress levels are as defined in the Aqueduct 3.0 dataset according to the ratio of total water withdraw-
als over the total available surface and groundwater supplies.
Source: IEA analysis based on WRI Aqueduct 3.0 dataset.
Source: IEA, 202136）
Figure 26　 Share of production volume by water stress level for selected minerals, 2020
IEA. All rights reserved.














37）， 38） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
38）
Notes: REE = rare earth element; CTUeco = comparative toxic unit for ecosystems; kgP-eq/kg = kilogramme of 
phosphorous-equivalent per kilogramme; m 3 /kg = cubic metres per kilogramme. Lithium data is for brine-
based resources. REE refers to neodymium iron boron （NdFeB） magnet. 
Source: IEA analysis based on Farjana, Huda and Mahmud （2019） （cobalt, copper, nickel）; Jiang et al. （2020） （lithi-
um） ; Marx et al. （2018） （REE） ; Tost et al. （2018） （bauxite and iron）．
Source: IEA, 202137）
Figure 27　 Indicators for water use and water pollution for selected minerals
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Note: MiBiD is a non-dimensional index based on data regarding land cover, protected areas and mining operations. 
Source: Kobayashi, Watando and Kakimoto, 2014. 
Source: IEA, 202138）
Figure 28　 Intensity of mining pressure on biodiversity for selected minerals
IEA. All rights reserved.
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Figure 28 provides an additional measure of environmental impacts, measured as the 
pressure on biodiversity. The IEA data suggest that the per kg impact of copper is about 65 
times more than iron.
Recycling and Substitution
Perhaps the most startling finding from Critical Minerals is the limits of recycling and 
substitution. Most work on energy transitions looks to recycling in “circular economy” strate-
gies as one key means to reduce the need for newly mined copper, cobalt, rare earths and 
other metals and minerals. Substitutions strategies complement this approach, by seeking 
new materials to replace the role of supply-constrained minerals used in batteries, solar pan-
els, and the like. For example, recycling and substitution are key elements of Japan’s ap-
proach, with Panasonic’s 2170 lithium-ion batteries for Tesla reducing the share of problem-
atic cobalt with increased nickel.　39）
But as we see in figure 29 , Critical Minerals does not expect recycling to become a 
significant source of supply for at least a couple of decades. The left-hand side of the figure 
39） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Note: GWh = gigawatt hour.
Source: IEA, 202139）
Figure 29　 Amount of spent lithium‐ion batteries from EVs and storage and recycled
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IEA. All rights reserved.
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shows that the 2020 stock of spent batteries is negligible, meaning their recycling cannot 
meet any of the escalating demand for battery storage. The right-hand side of the figure 
suggests that by 2030, recycled battery materials are at best a source of 1 % of demand, and 
even as late as 2040, recycling provides only about 8 % of demand. 
These results confirm earlier concerns about over-reliance on the circular economy. 
The IEA’s findings on this point are consistent with other recent empirical work, such as the 
German Fraunhofer Institute’s November 2020 study on “The Promise and Limits of Urban 
Mining.”40） Another example is the December 10 , 2020 survey from the Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies （HCSS）． The HCSS released a very detailed, book-length report on 
“Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy options for the Netherlands and the 
European Union,” which examined the critical mineral implications of the Dutch and EU com-
mitments to decarbonization. Their broad-based analysis included critical mineral demand 
for renewable energy （wind, solar, geothermal）， energy grid infrastructure, carbon-capture 
and storage, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. The HCSS warned that recycling and oth-
er “circular economy” policies would quite inadequate to address the massive increase in re-
quired critical minerals volumes implied by decarbonization. They pointed out one cannot 
simply recycle critical minerals that are being dug up and processed for use in a massive 
rollout of energy, EVs, and other systems that will be in use for one or a few decades.
To be sure, Critical Minerals does not deny the importance of recycling and substitu-
tion. In fact, the report emphasizes recycling and substitution’s importance in a broad strate-
gy of investment, innovation, recycling, supply chain resilience and sustainability standards. 
Figure 30 from the report suggests that there is significant room to raise end-of-life recy-
cling rates for many critical minerals. At the same time, achieving these increased rates con-
fronts constraints due to the role of amalgams, which make critical minerals difficult to sepa-
rate.
Figure 31 also shows that between 2010 and 2019 the recycled rates （as a fraction of 
inputs） remained relatively stable for aluminum, copper, lead and cobalt. As the tsunami of 
demand gathers pace from decarbonization, it is difficult to envision an increase in the recy-
cled rate of inputs. In all likelihood, these rates will fall in the short and medium term until a 
sufficiently massive stock of new infrastructure is in place and reaching its end-use phase.
40） See some of the data in Luis Tercero Espinoza, et al., “The promise and limits of Urban Mining: 
Potentials, Trade-Offs and Supporting Factors for the Recovery of Raw Materials from the Anthro-
posphere,” Fraunhofer ISI, November, 2020 : https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/isi/doku-
mente/ccn/2020/Fraunhofer_ISI_Urban_Mining.pdf
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　41）　42）
41）， 42） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
42）
Sources: Henckens（2021）; UNEP （2011） for aluminium; Sverdrup and Ragnarsdottir（2016）for platinum and palla-
dium; OECD （2019） for nickel and cobalt.
Source: IEA, 202141）
Figure 30　 End-of-life recycling rates for selected metals
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reused in end-use applications.
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics （2020）．
Source: IEA, 202142）
Figure 31　 Recycled input rates for selected metals and minerals












The upshot of the IEA analysis confounds the oft-repeated insistence that decarbon-
ization can avoid hard choices by simply fostering the circular economy and harvesting the 
“urban mine” of discarded smart phones, appliances, and conventional cars. To take a recent 
example, Japan recycled about 80,000 tons of mobile phones and other e-waste to get about 
2 tons of copper for Olympic medals.43） But in energy-transition terms, that nationwide project 
secured only 1/4 of the 8 tons of copper needed for a single MW of offshore wind capacity. 
To reiterate, the IEA data persuasively show that the global community is only begin-
ning to build a stock of energy-transition infrastructure, including long-distance networks, 
distributed grids, battery storage, electric vehicles, and offshore turbines. Once that huge 
stock is in place and portions of it have reached the end of their useful life, then one can ex-
pect substantial critical mineral flows from recycling. So while we certainly need to adopt 
much stronger policies right now on recycling and substitution, we should not expect them 
to bear ample fruit for decades.
What is to be Done?
As alluded to earlier, Critical Minerals emphasizes the urgency of comprehensive poli-
cy, including an intensive effort at recycling, substitution, and innovation that helps increase 
the efficient use of critical minerals. Critical Minerals also underscores the need for clear pol-
icy goals within decarbonization, so as to reduce the risks of critical minerals price volatility 
and other impediments to expanded supply via mining and processing. In addition, the report 
stresses the need for a regime of ESG-compliant critical minerals, both to protect the envi-
ronment and human wellbeing as well as to foster new supply. The latter aspect is a subtle 
way of saying that more diversified supply may be achieved by reducing the dominance of 
producers whose ability to downplay ESG-related issues impedes the opportunity for cleaner, 
more community-engaged producers to enter the market. 
A further recommendation is much stronger and integrated international governance. 
At present, there is a patchwork of international institutions and initiatives that address vari-
ous aspects of critical mineral mining and processing. But these efforts are poorly coordinat-
ed and often lack adequate transparency. The IEA rightly suggests that its energy security 
framework could be of service in this regard, by facilitation the collection and dissemination 
of credible data, regularly assessing the vulnerabilities of supply chains, enhancing flows of 
43） On this project, see “Tokyo 2020 Medal Project: Towards an Innovative Future for All,” Tokyo 
2020: https://olympics.com/tokyo-2020/en/games/medals-project/
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knowledge and sharing of best-practices, and raising ESG-type standards “to ensure a level 
playing field.”
And What About Japan?
To its credit, Japan is already doing a few of the items that the IEA points to, and re-
ceives a degree of acknowledgement in the report. Japan has long been a leading manufac-
turer of high-tech, critical mineral-intensive goods. So since the early 1980s, Japan has been 
assessing its critical material vulnerabilities. 
Japan initially undertook stockpiling of 7  key minerals including cobalt. But as we en-
tered the new millenium, with the globalization of ICT and other technologies, this approach 
was deemed insufficient to address the country’s increased critical mineral demand. So since 
the mid-2000s Japan has undertaken an explicit and increasingly robust strategy for desig-
nating critical minerals, and addressing supply risks by emphasizing overseas projects, ad-
vanced recycling, substitution and stockpiling. 
In tandem, Japan’s list of critical minerals has increased to a few dozen from the origi-
nal 7 . Japan has also built good clusters of expertise and initiatives in recycling and substi-
tution, linking those with US and other centres of excellence. One example from October 
2011 is the US-Japan-EU Trilateral Workshop on Critical Raw Materials. Also, since 2013 
Japanese specialists have been working with the US Department of Energy’s Ames Institute 
on the “effective use of critical materials.”
As to advanced recycling, that is a major priority. Japan seeks to expand collection of 
recyclable materials domestically and from overseas. Japan does have comparatively good 
initiatives on recycling and substitution. There is also a new effort to drill-down on tungsten, 
cobalt and 3  select rare earths. And as of March 2020, Japan instituted a New International 
Resource Strategy.44） This policy covers 34 critical minerals – referred to as “rare metals” - 
and includes increased and fine-tuned goals for stockpiling of emergency reserves and a 
greater ability for the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation （JOGMEC） to support 
private-sector mining and smelting initiatives. JOGMEC is also empowered to work with for-
eign firms in exploration activities. The country also officially aims at 80% self-sufficiency by 
2030 in base metals such as copper and nickel, and is aiming to undertake commercial exploi-
44） While the strategy per se is in Japanese, a brief outline in English is available at “New Interna-
tional Resource Strategy Formulated,” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 30, 2020: 
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/0330_005.html
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tation of its Exclusive Economic Zone seabed critical minerals from 2028.45）
Japan may be moving towards quantifying the enormous scale of its own critical min-
eral challenge. A report to the Ministry of Economy and Industry （METI） deliberation com-
mittee on energy on February 15, 2021 pointed out that installing just 10GW of offshore wind 
- about 3  nuclear reactors’ worth of power generation - by 2030 would require about 10% 
of Japan’s 2018 copper consumption and 20% of its niobum rare earth consumption.46） The 
METI is mooting 45 GW of offshore wind by 2040, which implies a lot of critical mineral de-
mand that will not be met by recycling and substitution. 
And that critical mineral demand is on top of critical mineral requirements for other 
clean energy generation, transmission and storage, electrified mobility, 5 G communications, 
data centres, and other elements of Japan’s critical material-intensive Society 5.0, decarbon-
ization, smart city, and related industrial policy ambitions.
Yet it is striking that Japan has yet to ballpark the overall critical mineral require-
ments for its goals. There are no comprehensive critical minerals assessments from within 
Japan, in spite of its lack of terrestrial critical mineral endowments. Indeed, the METI calcu-
lation of copper and niobium requirements for offshore wind is based on IEA data. But 
Japan’s offshore wind may be more material-intensive, due to greater oceanic depths, project 
distance from the shore, and distance from centres of power consumption. 
Moreover, on May 13 , 2021 Japan’s respected Research Institute of Innovative 
Technology for the Earth released a multi-scenario study on energy options. In its 100% re-
newable energy scenario, power prices quadrupled by 2050 because of intensive deployment 
of solar and wind coupled with electricity networks.47） So one would expect Japanese policy-
makers to undertake detailed analyses - to the extent possible - of Japan-specific critical 
mineral requirements.
New critical mineral mining and processing infrastructure generally take many years 
45） Japan’s policies are put in a comparative context by Jane Nakano in “The Geopolitics of Critical 
Minerals Supply Chains,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11 , 2021 : https://
www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-critical-minerals-supply-chains
46） See （in Japanese） p 21, “The Metal and Mineral Policies Towards Realizing Carbon Neutrality by 
2050 ,” February 15 , 2021 : https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/enecho/shigen_nenryo/kogyo/
pdf/007_03_00.pdf
47） See （in Japanese） “Scenario analyses of 2050 carbon neutrality （mid-term report），” Research In-
stitute of Innovative Technology for the Earth, report to basic policy subcommittee, May 13, 2021: 
https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/2021/043/043_005 .
pdf
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to put in place. So in the short run Japanese policy might be important to watch for poten-
tially innovative approaches to coping with critical mineral supply and price risks by for ex-
ample:
1 ） If possible, Japan should work with new US-Canada-Australia “Earth MRI” （Critical 
Minerals Mapping Initiative），48） which deploys the most advanced 3 D mapping technologies 
to identify CRM deposits in addition to natural disaster risks, and renewable energy resource 
potential. Japan has developed and diffused a lot of advanced mapping technology through its 
Society 5.0, National Resilience, and other initiatives, and could conceivably bring much to the 
table.
2 ） Japan could be working with India on exploring CRM （while also mapping disaster risks, 
RE potential）， as only 10% of India has been explored and both countries need CRM.49） 
3 ） Japan’s seafloor mining of CRM is expected to start in 2028, but that could be accelerat-
ed in tandem with Japanese collaboration on work suggesting deepsea mining is potentially 
more ESG-compliant than terrestrial.50） 
4 ） Japan’s JOGMEC and other agencies could work with Canadian and other projects on 
mineralization （mining with CO2 sequestration via mine tailings） and reap opportunities for 
green critical minerals plus more options in the Joint Crediting Mechanism.51）
5 ） Japan’s decarbonization goals are curiously uninformed by its significant climate adapta-
48） See “Critical Cooperation: How Australia, Canada and the United States are Working Together to 
Support Critical Mineral Discovery,” USGS, October 16, 2020: https://www.usgs.gov/news/critical-
cooperation-how-australia-canada-and-united-states-are-working-together-support
49） The details are at Biplop Chatterjee and Rayesh Chadha, “Non-Fuel Minerals and Mining: En-
hancing Mineral Exploration in India,” Brookings India Discussion Note, April, 2020: https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Enhancing-Mineral-Exploration-in-India.pdf
50） See Paulika, Daina, et al. “Life cycle climate change impacts of producing battery metals from 
land ores versus deep-sea polymetallic nodules,” Journal of Cleaner Production, December 2020 : 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652620338671
51） On mineralization see, “Giga Metals launches nickel CO2 capture project,” Craig Guthrie, August 
10 , 2020 : https://www.miningmagazine.com/sustainability/news/1392750/giga-metals-launches-
nickel-co 2 -capture-project
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tion strategy,52） even though the IPCC and other global agencies highlight the synergies of 
mitigation and adaptation. Japan might consider the critical mineral implications of these 
synergies. 
Conclusion
We have seen that the critical mineral challenge is enormous globally and within 
Japan. Japan is conspicuously lacking in the think tanks and comprehensive public-policy 
schools that could build on the IEA’s work, and assess Japan’s myriad smart city, decarbon-
ization and other targets in terms of Japan-specific critical mineral requirements.
Absent sudden substitution, recycling and other silver-bullet breakthroughs, it would 
appear that strategic prioritizing of the use of scarce critical minerals will be necessary. But 
there is limited evidence that this kind of thinking is - for example - animating discussion 
among the myriad stakeholders involved in ongoing deliberations on Japan’s strategic energy 
policy.
Even so, as it considers the sobering critical mineral implications of accelerated decar-
bonization, Japan may be able to get more traction in these areas. One reason for cautious 
optimism is that because of ageing, depopulation, and other challenges, Japan is getting in-
creasingly good at focusing scarce human, fiscal, material and other resources by addressing 
multiple problems simultaneously. Japan has a lot of Society 5.0, smart city, and other decar-
bonization industrial policies, and could use the looming crisis in critical minerals to gain 
more pragmatic, multi-stakeholder agreement. But at present, it remains to be seen if criti-
cal minerals emerge as a major, rather than minor, item in Japan’s upcoming revision of its 
energy strategy, slated for the summer or fall of 2021.
52） On this, see “Japan and Singapore Submit 2020 NDCs,” SDG Knowledge Hub, April 2 , 2020 : 
https://sdg.iisd.org/news/japan-and-singapore-submit-2020-ndcs/
